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In modern mining practice the use of hydraulic roof supports is common, allowing mined faces to advance or retreat
quickly with signiﬁcant beneﬁts to productivity.
These units vary considerably in size but the fundamentals of operation are essentially the same. A high pressure
hydraulic ﬂuid is pumped into hydraulic cylinders, controlled by valves. Solenoid valves control the ﬂow of pilot pressure to
spool valves that, in turn, control the power lower and power raise functions of the supports.
Following an incident when a roof support powered down unexpectedly resulting in fatal crush injuries to a miner, an
investigation was carried out to establish the cause. The investigation considered both control system and mechanical
failures. Early work focussed on the potential failure of the power lower solenoid valve and the possibility that the valve
could have passed hydraulic ﬂuid when in the de-energised position.
The solenoid valve implicated in the incident consisted of a number of components, the most signiﬁcant of which were
the valve operating pin, located between pairs of valve seats, and valve seat balls, the latterwere in turn located in recesses in
the valve seat oriﬁces.* Tel.: +44 1298 218222; fax: +44 1298 218270.
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valves. Thiswas achieved by themovement of the operating pin acting on the valve seat balls, such thatwhen one of the balls
was in situ in the valve seat recess, ﬂuid was prevented from ﬂowing through the valve seat oriﬁce, conversely, when the pin
was activated, pushing the ball from the valve seat oriﬁce, pilot pressure ﬂuid ﬂowed through the seat, energising the valves.
Effective operation of the valves relies on a good seal between the valve seat ball and the recess in the seat. Speciﬁcally, if a
good seal is not achieved then potentially, pilot pressure could ﬂow to the spool when the solenoid valve was de-energised,
resulting in the power lower function being inadvertently activated.
As part of the investigation two power lower valves were examined, valve A, from the incident roof support and valve B
from an adjacent roof support that had also shown evidence of unexpected movements.
2. Optical and scanning electron microscopy
2.1. Valve A power lower pressure port components
2.1.1. Valve seat
The valve A power lower pressure port valve seat oriﬁce is shown in a low magniﬁcation optical image in Fig. 1a. The
recess area for the valve seat ball, Fig. 1b, shows that the width of the recess varied radially and, on the right hand side of the
image, was approximately twice that on the left. Fig. 1c shows thewider area inmore detail and, in particular, an area within
the recess where the remnant of a foreign body, possibly an embedded particle, was apparent, Fig. 1d. Adjacent to this
particle, material appeared to have been lost in a pattern that suggested ﬂow, consistent with an erosion process, around the
particle in the direction of the oriﬁce, as indicated by the arrows on Fig. 1d. The scalloping pattern of ﬂow indicated that the
particle contact area with the valve seat recess was of the order of 20mm in diameter. Fig. 2a shows the valve seat tilted to
observe the bore of the oriﬁce and Fig. 2b shows the seat rotatedwith the particle remnant towards the bottom of the image.
There was an area within the bore of the oriﬁce, diametrically opposite the remnant of the particle, where loss of material or
pitting had occurred. The pitting was smooth with deﬁned peaks and consistent with an erosion process. The position of the
pitting was consistent with ﬂuid ﬂow or jetting from the position on the recess where the scalloping was most apparent,
across the diameter of the oriﬁce and onto the bore of the hole.[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. (a) Valve A power lower pressure port valve seat, (b) SEM image of valve A power lower valve seat, (c) erosion in valve seat recess, (d) detail of valve
seat erosion, position of particle and direction of ﬂow.
[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. (a) Valve seat recess tilted, (b) erosion in oriﬁce bore, (c) valve A operating pin, (d) SEM image of valve A operating pin, erosion at tip.
[(Fig._3)TD$FIG]
Fig. 3. (a) Detail of erosion at tip, (b) area of corrosion of pin, (c) valve A power lower valve seat ball, (d) detail of erosion of ball.
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[(Fig._4)TD$FIG]
Fig. 4. (a) Valve B valve seat ball recess, (b) detail of valve seat oriﬁce and recess, (c) detail of scalloping of valve seat recess, (d) detail of erosion of bore
oriﬁce.
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Visual examination of the operating pin, shown in Fig. 2c, suggested that one end was essentially undamaged and the
other had undergone some metal loss. The damaged end is shown in Fig. 2d and in more detail in Fig. 3a. Metal had
apparently been removed in various locations around the circumference leaving generally smooth, scalloped areas,
consistent with an erosion mechanism. In some locations, a rough, pitted surface was apparent, shown in Fig. 3b, which was
more consistent with a corrosion mechanism.
2.1.3. Valve seat ball
The valve A power lower ball, shown in Fig. 3c and d, was generally spherical but appeared to have undergone signiﬁcant
metal loss in one localised area. The appearance of the loss was consistent with scouring or erosion of the surface over a
length equivalent to approximately half the diameter of the ball.
2.2. Valve B power lower pressure port components
The valve B power lower, pressure port valve seat oriﬁce and the recesswhere the valve seat ball would have been located,
is shown in Fig. 4a and b.
It can be seen in Fig. 4a that thewidth, radial dimension, of the valve ball recess was greater on one side of the oriﬁce than
the other. The width of the recess, when viewed directly from above, was approximately 75mm around the majority of the
circumference, but at its widest was approximately 140mm. Fig. 4b and c show the area of widening of the recess and also
some scalloping of the surface in more detail. In addition, Fig. 4c shows a particle embedded in the surface of the recess. The
scalloping of the surface was generally smooth and uniform, and consistent with erosion by a hydraulic ﬂuid with the
direction of ﬂow towards the oriﬁce.
Fig. 4d shows an image of the bore of the valve seat oriﬁce at a position diametrically opposite the scalloping on the recess.
Material had been lost from the bore of the hole resulting in smooth pitting and sharp peaks, consistent with erosion.
2.2.1. Operating pin
The valve B power lower operating pin is shown under low power optical microscopy in Fig. 5a. The pin appeared to be
visually compliantwith engineering drawings, however one end of the pin, shown on the left in Fig. 5a, had been signiﬁcantly
damaged.
The damaged end of the pin is shown in more detail in the scanning electron microscopy images in Fig. 5b and c. These
show that almost the whole of this end of the pin had been removed over a length of approximately 0.2mm; this is
[(Fig._5)TD$FIG]
Fig. 5. (a) Valve B power lower operating pin, (b) SEM image of erosion of valve B power lower operating pin, (c) detail of erosion of power lower operating
pin, (d) detail of intact end of valve B power lower operating pin.
[(Fig._6)TD$FIG]
Fig. 6. (a) Valve B power lower pressure ball, (b) particles from power support solenoid valve, (c) illustration of mechanism of contamination of valve seat
and the ﬂow of ﬂuid around the ball and operating pin.
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Table 1
Material and hardness requirements (Hv).
Component Material Hardness
Operating pin BS 2056 Type 316S42 380–420
Valve seat 17-4PH precipitation hardened to H900 410 Hvmin
Valve seat ball 16/18Cr AISI 440B/440C 750 Hv 30
Table 2
Chemistry requirements (weight %).
Component C Si Mn P S Cr Mo Ni Cu
Operating pin 0.07 1.00 max 2.00 max 0.045 max 0.030 max 16–18.5 2.0–2.5 9.5–13.5 –
Valve seat 0.07 0.7 1.5 0.04 0.015 15–17 0.6 3–5 3–5
Valve seat ball 0.75–0.95 1.0 max 1.0 max 0.04 max 0.03 max 16–18 0.75 max – –
Table 3
Chemical analysis (weight %) from EDX and hardness results.
Component Si Mn Cr Mo Ni Cu Mean Micro-hardness (0.5 Hv)
Valve B Operating pin Mean 0.74 2.01 17.43 2.34 10.13 – 417.3
Valve A Operating pin Mean 0.65 2.05 17.22 2.29 10.16 – 421.8
Valve B seat Mean 0.36 0.46 16.84 – 2.25 – 445.6
Valve A seat Mean 0.37 0.49 16.75 0.03 225 0.11 461.7
Valve B seat ball Mean 0.57 0.48 14.57 – – – 736.9
Valve A seat ball Mean 0.59 1.58 18.17 2.40 10.07 0.23 312.8
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In general, the surfaces were smooth and consistent with metal loss by an erosion mechanism. There was no evidence of
surface features consistent with other failure processes.
2.2.2. Valve seat ball
The valve B power lower, pressure ball is shown in Fig. 6a. The ball was generally spherical but a number of areas on the
surface showed evidence ofmaterial having been removed. Two of these areaswere oval in shape and approximately 0.3mm
in length. The areas appeared to be shallow and the surfacewas generally smooth, again, consistentwith removal ofmaterial
by erosion.
In general, the observations of damage and metal removal on both sets of components was qualitatively very similar.
3. Chemical analysis and hardness
Drawings for the components of primary interest showed the requirements for material and hardness, these are detailed
in Table 1.
The speciﬁc chemistry requirements based on the drawing speciﬁcation are shown in Table 2.
3.1. EDX analysis
Each of the components was mounting in conducting resin and an area polished ﬂat to obtain optimum results from the
chemical analysis. The chemistrywas derived from the energy dispersive analysis of X-rays (EDX) using a dedicated detector
on a scanning electron microscope (SEM). The technique is semi-quantitative and therefore the results obtained are
approximations to the actual analysis. In addition, themethod is limited to heavier elements and therefore carbon cannot be
reliably detected. An analysis was carried out in three areas on each component to provide a statistically signiﬁcant average.
3.2. Micro-hardness
Because of the size of the components, micro-hardness tests were performed on the ﬂat polished areas prepared for the
EDX analysis. The tests were carried out in accordance with BS EN ISO 6507-1:1998 ‘‘Metallic materials–Vickers hardness
test’’ and the results had an accuracy of 3%. Five hardness indentations were made on the valve seats and operating pins, and
three on the balls.
The EDX analysis and micro-hardness data obtained for the three components is shown in Table 3.
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In both cases the EDX analysis showed operating pins were compliant with the speciﬁcation shown on the drawing and
the hardness was also close to speciﬁcation.1
3.4. Valve seats
The two valve seats were consistent in terms of analysis, however, the copper content of 3–5% speciﬁed on the drawing
was absent. In other words, the alloy fromwhich the seats had been made was not that speciﬁed. The copper content in this
alloy produces the precipitation hardening indicated by the ‘PH’ in the grade, see Table 1. The analysis was, however,
consistentwith an AISI 431 stainless steel alloy. Although the alloywas not consistent with that speciﬁed on the drawing the
hardness levels exceeded the 410HV minimum speciﬁed.
3.5. Balls
The ball from valve B was generally compliant with the material requirements, however the chromium levels were
somewhat low. Given the semi-quantitative nature of the analysis, this may not be signiﬁcant. The mean hardness was
approximately 2% less than that speciﬁed and, again, this may not have had a signiﬁcant effect on performance.
Analysis of the ball from valve A showed that it was an 18Cr 10Ni austenitic alloy rather than the 16–18Cr, lownickel alloy
speciﬁed and therefore entirely the wrong material. The speciﬁed material would have required heat treatment to develop
the high hardness, however, the chemical analysis suggested that an austenitic stainless steel alloy with limited hardness
had been used. This was borne out by the observation that the hardness was less than half that speciﬁed.
3.6. Chemical analysis – debris
In order to assess the size and composition of solid particulate debris within the valves, the small components from
another solenoid valve from the same support as valve B, were ultrasonically cleaned in acetone and the non-soluble debris
mounted on a carbon pad for analysis in the SEM. EDX was used to obtain qualitative indications of the elements present.
Fig. 6b shows one area of analysis.
The results showed that the particles ranged from sub-micron size to, in a small number of cases, particles up to 100mm
in size. X-ray analysis showed that the particles, in most cases, contained combinations of oxygen, silicon, iron, calcium and
other trace elements. This suggested that many of the particles were mineral in origin. A smaller number of particles,
consisting primarily of copper, may have been deposited in the valves from elsewhere within the hydraulic system.
4. Discussion
The valve seats, operating pins and valve seat balls examined all showed evidence of erosion damage by a ﬂuid. Erosion
occurs [1,2] as a result of impact by droplets or jets of ﬂuid on a surface, leading to the progressive removal of material from
that surface. The inclusion of particles within the ﬂow can also lead to erosion but it is not a pre-requisite. Corrosion can also
contribute to the erosion process and some evidence of corrosion on the valve A operating pin suggested that corrosionmay
have played a part, although there was little evidence of corrosion on other components. Erosion processes require the
movement of the active ﬂuid onto or over a surface, however with the valve seat ball correctly located within the valve seat
recess, no movement and consequently no erosion could have taken place.
The damage to the three components (valve seat, ball and operating pin) indicates that a jet or stream of ﬂuid had passed
over the surface of the ball and the valve seat recess, in a localised area, and had impinged on the operating pin and the bore
of the valve seat oriﬁce. The variation in damage observed on different components, for example the valve B ball and the
operating pin, reﬂects the difference in hardness of the two components and the angle of incidence of the jet, erosion
increasing with decreasing hardness and increasing angle of incidence.
In addition to the material hardness and the angle of incidence, the ﬂow rate, velocity, properties of the ﬂuid and
time of exposure together with the size and properties of entrained particles all contribute to the process. Given the
uncertainty in a number of these variables, it is not possible to estimate the period of time over which the degradation
had occurred.
Analysis of debris showed that there were large numbers of particles ranging in size from sub-micron up to in excess of
100mm in size. Electron microscopy has also shown evidence of particles embedded on the valve seat recess surface, in a
position where they would prevent the valve seat ball from seating correctly. This led to ﬂow of hydraulic ﬂuid between the
ball and the valve seat recess when the valve was nominally in the de-energised (closed) position and, in turn, to the erosion
of the valve seat recess, the bore of the oriﬁce, the valve seat ball and the operating pin, shown schematically in Fig. 6c. The1 The mean hardness of 5 indentations was 1.8 Hv higher than speciﬁed (valve A) but within the 3% error range and, in the author’s opinion, not
signiﬁcant.
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of the order of 20mm or less, thus the system was very sensitive to the cleanliness of the hydraulic ﬂuid.
Chemical analysis and hardness testing showed that the valve seats, although not chemically compliant with engineering
drawings, had hardness levels close to those speciﬁed. However, of the two valve seat balls examined, one had been
manufactured from the correct material and had appropriate hardness but the other, from valve A, had been manufactured
from a material consistent with an austenitic stainless steel and had a hardness less than half of that speciﬁed. Material
hardness is an important property in areas where erosion needs to be controlled, however, in this case, erosion was a
symptom of failure rather than the underlying cause but the use of a non-speciﬁedmaterial indicated a loss control over the
manufacturing process.
In summary, it is highly likely that power lower solenoid valve A failed as a result of one or more contaminant particles
becoming trapped between the valve seat recess and the valve seat ball allowing hydraulic ﬂuid to pass when the valve was
in the nominally de-energised position. A contaminant particle may not have been present at the time of the incident; it is
also possible that the erosion of the valve seat and ball, occurring at some previous time, prevented an adequate seal forming,
again, allowing ﬂuid to pass with the valve in the de-energised position.
Failure of the solenoid valve may have occurred on the ﬁrst instance when a particle became trapped between the valve
seat and ball, on the other hand, ﬂuid ﬂow may have been sufﬁcient to cause erosion but not sufﬁcient to activate the spool
valve. Over time, the erosion of the components would have become more severe, increasing the likelihood of ﬂow through
the valve and consequently failure. It is also likely that instances of failure would occur on a statistical basis, depending on
the presence or not of particles on the valve seat and on the essentially random orientation of the eroded ball.
Hydraulic systems of this type contain several levels of ﬁltration to capture particulate matter, however in this instance,
hoses supplying hydraulic ﬂuid to the roof supports had been removed and replaced underground, in conditions that allowed
contaminant particles to enter the ﬂuid, bypassing sections of the ﬁltration system.
5. Conclusions
Valve A had failed as a result of particles of material becoming trapped between the valve seat recess and the valve seat
ball, leading to erosion of the valve seat recess, valve seat ball and the valve operating pin; this allowed hydraulic ﬂuid to ﬂow
when the valve was nominally in the de-energised position.
Analysis of particles within the valves showed that numbers of particles were up or greater than 100mm in size and this
pointed to a failure to maintain the cleanliness of the hydraulic ﬂuid system.
The material of construction of the valve seats was not compliant with engineering drawings although the hardness
values were close to those speciﬁed.
The material of construction of the valve seat balls was within speciﬁcation in one case but was incorrect in another,
indicating an issue with the control of materials at manufacture or during maintenance.
The investigation demonstrated the importance of maintaining the cleanliness of hydraulic systems and of the need to
control the materials of manufacture in safety critical applications.
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